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Capital Markets Union and Ending Short-Termism: Lessons from the 
European Commission’s Public Consultation 
DIETER PESENDORFER 




The European Commission’s initiative to establish a Capital Markets Union is in 
sharp conflict with the more radical goals of downsizing significantly certain 
financial activities and firms that have become too-big-to-fail and too-big-to-govern 
and of ending or at least drastically limiting extreme speculation and short-termism 
in finance and the real economy in order to increase financial stability. The recent 
public consultation on the Commission’s Green Paper Building a Capital Markets 
Union gives evidence of how weak such demands are compared to calls for deeper 
capital markets with more ‘shadow banking’ and rebuilding (sound) securitisation. 
The consultation is an example of how framing the problem and the refined better 
regulation agenda influence post-crisis financial reregulation and help to marginalize 
more radical ideas demanding a return to a more traditional banking model and 
transforming finance back to serving the real economy.  
 




The European Commission (EC) under President Jean-Claude Juncker started in 2014 
with a clear agenda of improving the quality of regulation to boost economic growth 
and job creation for the sluggish European economy.1 Facing the fallout of the global 
financial and Eurozone crises, Europe has been experiencing a slower economic 
recovery than the United States (US).2  The relaunched idea of a Capital Markets 
Union (CMU)3 became a major initiative to deal with the funding aspects of 
economic recovery and long-term economic growth by making the European capital 
markets more similar to the US markets. The EC argued that this would make the EU 
economy more competitive and would help to attract more investment from third 
countries. Additionally, the EC claimed that the creation of a CMU would serve the 
‘real economy’ of the non-financial sectors and especially be in the interest of small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that traditionally play the strongest role in 
economic growth and employment.4 While the Banking Union, adopted in direct 
response to the Eurozone crisis to address the most severe shortcomings of the 
currency union, is foremost for the Eurozone member states but open to all other 
member states, CMU is like the Single Rulebook5 for all financial actors aimed at the 
entire European Union (EU).6 CMU is in particular an attempt to transform medium- 
and long-term financing from a predominantly bank-based funding system to a capital 
markets-based system aiming at “improving the access to financing for all businesses 
across Europe and investment projects, in particular start-ups, SMEs and long-term 
projects; increasing and diversifying the sources of funding from investors […]; and 
making the markets work more effectively”.7 Based on the assumption that a capital 
markets-based financing system is superior to the traditional, although already 
transformed European bank-based system and on a comparison between the European 
system of incomplete financial integration and the much more integrated and 
developed US capital markets, the EC has argued that diversification of funding and 
deeper capital markets are necessary to overcome fragmented financial markets in the 
EU and to ensure the functioning of the internal market.  
The EC published in February 2015 the Green Paper Building a Capital Markets 
Union8 for public consultation. Key areas of a CMU were presented separately in two 
further consultation documents: one on “a new framework for simple, transparent and 
standardised securitization”9 and one on the reform of the Prospectus Directive.10 In 
the context of the reformulated Better Regulation agenda under the current 
Commission, the CMU initiative is an important area where the new approach can be 
tested. This article analyses some key issues related to CMU in the broader regulatory 
context and arising from the Green Paper consultation. Section A presents key 
challenges for establishing CMU in the context of wider debates about the role of 
finance and financial stability and the EC’s approach. Section B then discusses how 
the EC has framed the public consultation, before the following Section C analyses 
the consultation contributions. Finally, Section D concludes, drawing lessons from 
this example, including lessons for post-crisis financial reforms in general and about 
the EC’s new approach to regulation. 
 
A Economic recovery, short-termism, capital markets, and the real economy 
Over recent years, financial sector firms pushed strongly to expand business 
opportunities and profitable activities in an ever more challenging regulatory and 
market environment in which they are also seeking to stop, slow down or even reverse 
financial reforms that could generate regulatory burdens after a period of rapid 
change. Against the backdrop of this particular business pressure a new deregulatory 
agenda emerged, based on the claim that the cumulative effect of previous financial 
reforms would have negative results that need to be corrected. The EC incorporated 
this view into its reformulated Better Regulation agenda and CMU idea.11 
Commissioner Hill, downplaying fears that this might result in “a big bonfire of 
existing regulations in the name of growth”,12 emphasized that this “new approach to 
regulation” would result in “less new legislation in the future and more focus on 
bedding-in in the reforms of recent years”. This includes especially a focus on the 
“cumulative impact” of post-crisis reforms. Hill summarised this approach as: “Not to 
question the fundamentals of the approach but to take a look at the combined effect of 
our legislation and ask ourselves whether we have always achieved the correct 
balance between stability and growth.”13  
The CMU initiative, however, is also a response to the slow economic recovery 
following the Great Recession and an attempt to fundamentally change the market 
structure of the European economy. In fact it is more the latter with a focus on long-
term growth and investment as the envisaged changes will only slowly transform 
markets and therefore do little to address the immediate economic recovery problems. 
Compared to calls for more government intervention and less austerity, CMU offers 
an approach of boosting investment that should mostly be driven by markets and only 
be supported by law when necessary, especially to overcome regulatory barriers. In 
this situation the ‘underdeveloped capital markets’ hypothesis found strong support 
by claiming that bank-based finance systems would generate significant welfare 
losses over capital markets-based systems. This hypothesis remains contested14 and is 
insufficiently linked to a more systematic comparison of growth in different systems 
and periods. For the US concerns about a rather problematic economic growth in 
recent decades have been expressed and the current recovery has been described as 
‘the worst economic recovery in history’.15 Without any doubt, changes in finance in 
general and in capital markets in particular raise serious issues with regard to their 
overall effects on growth, investment, and job creation and a fundamental shift 
towards a capital markets-based system would deserve a closer investigation of the 
long-term overall effects. However, the EC’s Green Paper uses the US capital markets 
as the top-performer benchmark without discussing any negative effects or risks and 
highlights “potential benefits” of making the EU economy more similar by stating: 
“Compared with the US, medium-sized companies, […] receive five times more 
funding from capital markets than they do in the EU. If our venture capital markets 
were as deep, as much as Euro 90 billion of funds would have been available to 
finance companies between 2008 and 2013.”16 The overall comparison between the 
US and EU within the EC’s narrative remains rather simplistic and under-complex. 
Key questions about increased financial instability from poorly regulated capital 
markets, growth rates, business expectations and austerity, and increasing inequality 
and how they are linked to a particular financing system that reproduces short-
termism and other highly problematic developments in capital markets and in the 
“real economy” have been neither asked nor answered by supporters of the CMU 
initiative. One might not be too surprised about the lack of engagement with critical 
literature17 discussing how the increased role of finance and capital markets has 
undermined growth in the ‘real economy’ and led to a system of “profits without 
production” and “casino capitalism” with more inequality in societies, although one 
of the lessons of the global financial crisis has been that ignoring literature outside the 
mainstream is problematic. However, even more mainstream contributions from key 
regulators asking about the ‘right size’ of various parts of the financial system18 or 
putting the ‘underdeveloped capital markets’ hypothesis into question19 and raising 
concerns about too much globalization and too much influence of finance20 or 
demands for “inclusive growth”21 have so far found no response from CMU 
supporters. Also concerns about possible effects of rather significant changes in 
financial markets on competitive and comparative advantages of member states with a 
traditionally more bank-based finance system are lacking discussion.22  
On the other hand, CMU supporters and the EC picked up some key concerns about 
problematic developments in financial markets, especially they – at least claim to – 
aim at making finance work for the “real economy” and at ending short-termism in 
certain areas of economic decision-making. The discussion about effects of CMU on 
the “real economy”, however, is also under-complex and reduced to the claims that 
funding would improve for all businesses and the system would become more crises 
resilient. Especially the claim that CMU would foremost be to the advantage of SMEs 
was quickly challenged.23   
Short-termism is a term that has been used for quite some time for both the political 
and the economic sphere. In theories about policy and state failure, short-termism was 
described as deeply enshrined in Western democracies with institutions generally 
privileging short-term over longer-term interests be it via the relatively short election 
cycle and politicians’ re-election focus or the influence of strong veto players in 
decision-making who profit from short-term decisions. In economics and corporate 
governance, short-termism has become broadly used to describe negative 
consequences of the shareholder value orientation and a number of very problematic 
aspects of the increased importance of finance over the “real economy”. Especially in 
the sustainability discourse this critique developed further and expanded to 
intergenerational questions: while necessary long-term measures might result in losses 
for current generations and businesses, it is future generations without political 
representation that would profit most from a shift. Even for the strongest supporters of 
the shareholder value theory short-termism has become a key concern in need of 
radical reform. Alfred Rappaport, as most prominent advocate, has shown that short-
termism, reproduced by perverse incentives undermining public companies and 
capital markets, has reached such a destructive dimension that it endangers the 
survival of capitalism, economic growth and individual well-being.24  
With regard to financial integration in Europe, short-termism was already discussed 
as a problem before the crisis.25 The EU has recognised short-termism as a serious 
problem in capital markets26 and has taken various steps to end short-termism. The 
European Semester tries to tackle short-term oriented quick fixes by member states; in 
company law a change is planned with the Shareholder Rights Directive27 that would 
reward long-term shareholders in companies with extra voting rights or loyality 
dividends and other measures have been put forward to discourage excessive short-
termism and short-term risk taking in financial markets. The idea to strengthen long-
term investments over several years or even decades is also the core idea in the 
“proposal for a Regulation on European Long-term Investment Funds”. However, the 
overall approach is still not changing the system radically enough and some ideas 
such as financing public infrastructure via capital markets instead of securing 
sufficient tax revenue have been criticised. Moreover, booms in High Frequency 
Trading (HFT) and the creation of dark pools as well as a still huge over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives market give ample evidence of a continued and increasing 
importance of extreme speculation. More radical proposals for banning such activities 
and problematic products and to introduce a strict product policy have largely been 
ignored.28 A Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) that would disadvantage indirectly 
various activities and products and incentivize long-term over short-term investment 
and which would be a more moderate proposal was only introduced in limited 
versions by some EU member states. The EC’s attempt to introduce such a tax for the 
entire EU failed because of the resistance of several member states led by the UK 
government. The alternative approach of introducing an FTT in the willing states via 
enhanced cooperation is still not realized and opposition to the EU implementing 
Directive has increased.29 The structural reforms of banking, proposed by the 
previous Commission, have also made slow progress and faced fierce opposition.30 
The issue of proprietary trading related to this reform also did not feature in the EC’s 
Green Paper. In short, a lot of concern about financial stability can be raised from 
what is not in the Green Paper. 
 
B The EC’s public consultation  
The EC’s public consultations were cleverly split into the Green Paper and the more 
technical subjects of sound securitisation and the prospectus, allowing with the Green 
Paper a more systematic exploration of areas and barriers for achieving a significant 
progress towards the “building blocks”31 for a full CMU within a short period and to 
formulate an Action Plan in 2015 with clear priorities to be implemented by 2019 
already and long-term goals beyond. The Green Paper as well as an accompanying 
Staff Working Document on CMU,32 published at the same time, framed the debate 
with the “underdeveloped capital markets” hypothesis and both documents were 
designed to invite not so much any debate about the theoretical assumptions and the 
goals as such but to direct the focus in line with the redesigned Better Regulation 
agenda on practical proposals to redesign capital markets especially from a business 
perspective and in line with business needs. The revival of securitisation should now 
be sound with more transparency, but main issues about possible bailouts of central 
clearinghouses and overall systemic instability remain unsolved.  
The EC also framed the CMU discussion by downplaying how fundamental the 
envisaged change in market structures would be by interpreting its initiative as 
nothing more than the realisation of the “free flow of capital” already enshrined in the 
Treaty of Rome.33 A discussion about how modern capital markets differ from what 
anyone back then might have imagined or about how deeper financial integration can 
be achieved without creating an ever more powerful financial sector and how 
integration is corresponding with a strategy of downsizing finance at least in its most 
harmful structures and activities is unsurprisingly missing in both consultation 
documents. The EC focuses instead on how to drive integration via markets, 
supported by regulation, for example via a pan-European “29th regime”.34     
Rather disappointingly, the Green Paper discusses short-termism not systematically 
and mentions the term only once by stating that this would cause restrictions for the 
“significant amount of new infrastructure investment” needed to maintain the Union’s 
competitiveness.35 In the context of corporate governance, the EC mentions the 
revision of the Shareholder Rights Directive. The Commission Staff Working 
Document accompanying the Green Paper expanded that issue a bit in its section “6.2. 
Short-termism and regulatory features drive inefficient asset allocation”.36 The EC 
there describes short-termism as “an apparent problem”. Large “institutional 
investors, such as pension funds, which have long-term liabilities and have the 
capacity to be ‘patient’ investors often do not allocate sufficient amount of funds to 
long-term investment”. The EC explains this primarily with their “short-term 
investment horizon” – which is a highly important feature of modern financial 
markets and would deserve more investigation – but also with “flaws in the regulatory 
framework” such as “investment mandates of pension funds in some member states, 
requiring that over 50% of assets under management is invested in sovereign 
bonds”.37 The EC has already proposed a directive, which “would stop member states 
banning occupational pension funds from investing in assets with a long-term profile 
such as infrastructure, unless the restrictions are justified on prudential grounds”.38 
The EC Staff Working Document also mentions the short-term outlook for financial 
reporting and existing incentive schemes and compensation structures for asset 
managers and refers to the Kay Review on UK equity markets39 “for an extended 
analysis” and to the revision of the Shareholder Rights Directive with regard to 
“incentivizing a better alignment of the long-term interests of institutional investors, 
their asset managers and companies through transparency and public consultation”.40 
The European Parliament adopted the latter with amendments on 8 July 2015. In 
short, although there is some reference to short-termism, the issue did not get the 
overall importance and centrality it would deserve.  
The Green Paper and the Staff Working Document are also disappointing with regard 
to any meaningful discussion of high frequency trading, dark pools or the financial 
transaction tax. High frequency trading is only mentioned with regard to new 
technologies but there is no discussion and no concern raised and both documents are 
silent on dark pools and the FTT. The consultation questionnaire does no justice to the 
importance of these issues. Given that the EC has supported enhanced cooperation in 
the area of FTT with a Directive41 and therefore indicated that the EC would like to 
see harmonisation in the long run, one could have expected a more pro-active 
approach. In the meantime, Commissioner Hill has publicly stated that he is not in 
support of the FTT and that he regards it as a post-crisis idea that is unsuitable in a 
more business-friendly environment focusing on jobs, investment and growth.42 
Already much earlier some member states supporting the FTT had complained about 
insufficient EC support.  
Although the Green Paper is weak in terms of driving the design of capital markets 
towards more sustainable capital markets with less complex structures, less extreme 
speculation and more long-term, environmental and socially fair orientation of 
investors and business more generally, the public consultation online questionnaire43 
offered some scope for raising such interests. Question 1 asked generally about what 
other than “the five priority areas identified for short term action” the EC should 
prioritise in the Action Plan. Question 7 asked whether “any action by the EU” is 
“needed to facilitate the development of standardized transparent and accountable 
ESG (Environment, Social and Governance) investment, including green bonds, other 
than supporting the development of guidelines by the market”. Question 10 invited 
suggestions for policy measures that “could incentivize institutional investors to raise 
and invest larger amounts and in a broader range of assets, in particular long-term 
projects, SMEs and innovative and high growth start-ups”.  
The larger number of questions was framed in a way to support the EC’s preferred 
redesign of capital markets. Typical formulations chosen were “what support can be 
given”, “what further measures are needed/could help”, “are there barriers” or what 
best practices would exist. Question 19, for example, asked: “What policy measures 
could increase retail investment?” and question 19.1 “What else could be done to 
empower and protect EU citizens accessing capital markets?” without raising first the 
issue of whether retail investment should be increased or what risks that might create. 
Question 21 asked how the EU can ensure it is ‘internationally competitive and an 
attractive place in which to invest”, an issue where the question could have been 
raised whether the EU can in some areas lead global reforms towards more 
sustainable financial markets. With regard to the FTT question 19 as well as question 
30 asking about barriers “around taxation that should be looked at as a matter of 
priority to contribute to more integrated capital markets” were of importance. The 
final question 32 did not ask if there are any aspects that the EC overlooked, but 
invited again responses supporting the overall goal: “Are there other issues, not 
identified in this Green Paper, which in your view require action to achieve a Capital 
Markets Union?” In short, the consultation questionnaire does not reflect a possibility 
of an alternative CMU as part of a wider strategy to downsize finance.  
C Lessons from the CMU public consultation 
Public consultations on financial reforms (or any business regulation) usually receive 
the overwhelming number of responses from firms and their business organisations 
and these actors are also the main addressees with the questions. This was 
unsurprisingly also the case with the CMU consultation and as usual responses 
differed in quality, with some giving only answers to a limited number of questions 
affecting their core interests and others reflecting also on the wider policy 
implications and using the opportunity to submit further information such as position 
papers or studies. According to the statistical data the EC published together with the 
consultation contributions, the CMU public consultation resulted in a total of 425 
responses, 374 were published on the Commission website.44 Those came from 21 
private individuals, 306 organisations or companies, and 47 public authorities. The 
largest group was industry associations (131), followed by companies (68), NGOs 
(21), consultancy and law firms (11), think-tanks (10), consumer organisations (6), 
academic institutions (4), and trade unions (3). Among the public authorities the 
largest contribution came from governments or ministries (18), followed by 
regulatory or supervisory authorities, including central banks (11), international or 
European organisations (10), other public authorities (5), and regional or local 
authorities (3). The largest number of contributions came from the UK (83), followed 
by Belgium (63), France (52), Germany (49), the Netherlands (18), and Ireland (10). 
All other member states and other countries had mostly far below 10 submissions. 
The largest number of responses came from the banking sector (102), followed by 
investment management (93), other financial services (67), insurance (61), market 
infrastructure operations (56), pension provision (43), and the non-financial sector 
(42).  
The statistics show a strong expression of business interests and especially actors 
from member states with relatively highly developed capital markets responded to 
shape the future CMU according to their preferences. The limited engagement from 
actors from Southern and Eastern European member states undermines somewhat the 
broad claim by Commissioner Hill that the CMU would be “a classic single market 
project for all 28 Member States” and that there would have been “a real groundswell 
of support, from right across Europe”.45 However, Hill, in the same speech, insisted 
that it would be “countries which don’t have established financial centres whose 
businesses and investors could benefit the most, because the CMU should create the 
conditions for capital to cross borders, to flow to entrepreneurs with high growth 
potential, no matter where they are located.” In his summary, Hill did not mention any 
tensions between member states or different kind of actors, although it was early in 
the CMU debate that some observers feared the existing variety of interests might 
make it very difficult for the EC to balance all the interests.46  
As one could assume from a “varieties of capitalism” perspective,47 the responses 
reflect concerns that countries differ in their experiences with bank and capital 
markets and have different interests and preferences reflecting domestic economic 
structures. The Czech National Bank48 argued that there is “no greater added value” 
in the CMU project because “the strengthened banking sector will increasingly 
perform the traditional function of lending to the economy in the near future”. The 
Estonian Ministry of Finance, although largely supportive of CMU, was worried that 
markets with smaller scale intermediaries could get “swallowed by the larger scale 
capital markets” and suggested more relaxed regulation for smaller financial firms. 
French banks missed in the Green Paper clear measures to establish European 
champions. The French Banking Association complained that the Green Paper 
underestimates the importance of banks and seems to assume “a sort of zero-sum 
game in which the role of capital markets is to compensate for banks’ reduced lending 
capacity”. The association, highlighting various advantages of a bank-based system 
and regulatory gaps in the area of shadow banking, also denied any “empirical 
evidence to suggest that one financial system or type of financial intermediation is 
better than another at promoting economic growth”. The French association also 
highlighted the importance of bank-based systems by referring to how this system 
influenced innovation in Germany and generally made a case for competition between 
bank-based and market-based systems in Europe within a future CMU.  
Various German actors expressed concerns about their traditional funding system 
based on Hausbanken and the three pillars system with strong relationships to their 
borrowers. The Bavarian association of cooperative banks (Genossenschaftsverband 
Bayern eV), for example, stated that the company structure in Europe would generally 
better suit a bank-based funding system. Changes in capital markets should, according 
to the association, also reflect differences between stakeholder and shareholder 
models. The association of guarantee banks (Verband Deutscher Bürgschaftsbanken 
eV) also warned against any negative effects on the German banking model. The 
German Banking Industry Committee emphasised the important role of banks 
generally and that the EC would insufficiently consider “the demand side of the 
market”. Especially the powerful German trade union DGB opposed the CMU project 
and claimed that the risks would be higher than any benefits. Finance should be 
reduced to a proper size instead as a CMU would have high costs and only increase 
shareholder value influence and it would not serve a long-term orientation in 
investment. The DGB also pointed towards negative experiences with capital markets 
in Germany, for example with regard to private equity, and warned against 
deregulation and insufficient regulation of shadow banking. In short, the trade union 
called for a local and regional banking system. Also highly critical was the response 
by the less influential German NGO World Economy Ecology & Development 
(WEED), which questioned “if the commission has sufficiently considered what the 
reasons for the investment gap are and if capital markets are the best option to pursue 
the aim of a increased investments and a better long-term productivity” and 
highlighted the advantages of public local savings banks and cooperative banks. 
Similarly, World Future Council, another German NGO, argued against CMU and in 
favor of the bank-based European model. 
Concerning the strengths of banks during the crisis, different experiences across 
countries became apparent: While some German actors observed SMEs profiting 
from smaller banks and the Hausbanken system during the crisis and that “the 
banking sector fulfilled its duties in terms of corporate financing during the financial 
crisis”,49 Irish SMEs suffered more and found it difficult to secure finance. The Irish 
Business and Employers Confederation (ibec) expected a gradual improvement with 
economic recovery but generally shared the EC’s prognosis of a “more restrictive” 
lending situation for SMEs “compared to the pre-crisis period”. The German Banking 
Committee, however, warned about too much hope in capital markets to make a 
difference in the Eurozone periphery where the “restrictive access to credit” would 
“also result from the poor credit quality of many companies as a consequence of the 
full-scale economic downswing.”50 In short, we see clear tensions between actors who 
think that the bank-based system still has its advantages and strengths and can fulfil 
its roles even when required to meet stricter capital requirements or at least when 
regulatory gaps in the area of shadow banking are closed, and other actors who 
believe that the post-crisis situation requires stronger capital markets to even return to 
pre-crisis funding levels. Hence there are powerful actors in the more bank-based 
systems that push for a capital markets-based system, while only a minority of actors 
distinguish between different forms of bank-based systems. In Germany the powerful 
industry association BDI called, for example, for measures against overregulation and 
expressed hopes that CMU would “compensate errors in banking regulation”. A more 
detailed analysis shows, of course, that the changes to regulation necessary to create a 
level playing field between different firms are interpreted rather differently.  
Most responses were indeed highly supportive of the idea of a CMU and focused on 
practical problems and barriers of realising it. With regard to long-term investments 
and sustainability, most actors agreed with the EC that voluntary measures to support 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) investment are sufficient, whereby some 
actors including banks recommended incentives such as lower capital requirements 
for ESG. Only a limited number of actors addressed explicitly the need for “building 
sustainability into the foundations of the CMU”.51  
A major conflict between EU policies was identified by a large number of responses, 
including non-financial firms and pension funds, between realising a CMU and 
implementing an FTT via enhanced cooperation. Some only stated generally a 
negative impact from an FTT or expect an “un-level” playing field with extra costs in 
the jurisdictions supporting enhanced cooperation; others emphasised negative effects 
for certain groups such as pensioners or end investors or even presented detailed 
arguments against the tax in its currently discussed form. In any case, a clear majority 
of responses raised a serious concern about FTT impacts on CMU. The Association 
for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME) even went so far as to claim that an FTT 
would “outweigh” any benefits from a CMU.52 Deutsche Bundesbank, known to be 
critical about the FTT, suggested “any future implementation of this tax should at 
least not counteract key goals of the CMU. For instance, the tax should not aggravate 
illiquidity risks in key markets, and it should not ‘penalise’ the trading of equity 
instruments vis-à-vis debt instruments.” 
Surprisingly, there were only a few supporters of an FTT using this opportunity to 
make a case for this tax in the context of redesigning capital markets.53 Not even 
Finance Watch, a European-wide watchdog for financial reforms, thought about 
incorporating the FTT into its response. It seems that the EC’s approach of not 
actively addressing this issue at all in its consultation documents worked well in the 
interest of FTT opponents, while FTT supporters were distracted by other issues or 
simply missed the opportunity.  
Only a few responses addressed HFT and dark pools. Like with the FTT, Finance 
Watch missed submitting its otherwise well-known position. Also the European 
Consumer Organisation, BEUC, did not raise any concerns in this regard but focused 
on strict product governance as a necessary priority for the CMU. The Bavarian 
association of cooperative banks, which opposed the FTT, demanded simply “no 
space for dark pools” without further discussion. High frequency trading was raised 
by the Bank of England as an issue of “an unfair market environment on electronic 
venues, with questionable benefits to the broader market from trading occurring at 
ever-faster speeds.” The Bank of England also mentioned dark pools and the need for 
transparency requirements.  
All in all, the consultation responses on these highly problematic subjects can be 
summarised as rather moderate.  A more forward looking consultation document 
aiming at more sustainable capital markets could have achieved more useful 
comments on short-termism, FTT, HFT and dark pools.  
Overall the public consultation did a good job in confirming the EC’s general 
approach and securing the required support for the way forward, while keeping more 
radical ideas marginalised. Commissioner Hill summarized the Commission’s next 
steps along the line of “three themes as being at the heart of the project: how the 
CMU can increase funding options for business; how it can create more opportunities 
for investors; and how it can encourage cross border investments”.54 
D Conclusion 
Two contributors to the public consultation have rightly argued that it would be 
necessary not just to present the advantages of a CMU but also to address the possible 
negative consequences: “the potential hazards and drawbacks must receive equal 
attention”.55 The French Banking Association also criticised that the EC “green paper 
does not address the costs and risks of capital markets union” and that CMU “will not 
come free of charge.” The EC has so far not shown any willingness to address such 
concerns and continues presenting a rather simple idea according to which advantages 
from the capital markets-based system would always be at play but especially 
compensate for any weaknesses in the banking system whenever necessary. Lending 
in the whole economy could never dry up in this model and moreover increasing 
equity investment would make the European economy more shock resilient. Clear 
weaknesses of a capital markets-based system are downplayed or ignored. A more 
nuanced debate that seeks to explain and justify the future of a particular growth 
model for Europe in the context of benefits and risks would be desirable. None of the 
three themes identified by Hill raises any problems or possible conflicts between 
different varieties of European capitalism that are likely to occur more sharply during 
the next steps of fine-tuning the initiative and making it reality.  
However, there is a notable change in the language used now with regard to SMEs. 
The original claim from supporters that CMU would be foremost in the interests and 
to the advantage of SMEs did not fly and is now replaced with a new narrative. 
Commissioner Hill had already earlier, in a debate at the Brookings Institution and 
confronted with the US experience, confessed that the SME rhetoric was only there 
“to sell the idea”. On the basis of the feedback received to the Green Paper, the 
Commission now argues: “Bank lending will of course remain central to the European 
economy and in particular will be the staple source of funding for SMEs. But […] 
more innovative new businesses with higher returns, but also higher risk, find it hard 
to get investment from banks. Then there are other gaps where SMEs find it difficult 
to attract capital as they seek to expand.” In short, the EC is now confirming that the 
CMU is of little benefit for the majority of companies that have originally rightly 
been identified as key for growth and job creation. One of the goals of CMU 
supporters is to redirect savings into more profitable investments, which would 
change the funding structure of banks. As Finance Watch highlighted in its response 
to the public consultation: “retail savings held in bank deposits do finance the real 
economy as they provide stable funding for banks that in turn provide loans to non-
financial corporations and households. Shifting savings to capital markets would lead 
to more bank reliance on wholesale funding, more fragile bank funding structures and 
a higher cost of funding for banks.”56 It would therefore be necessary to focus 
foremost on the question how CMU might endanger the traditional relationship in a 
banking system that is so crucial for SMEs and how to design a CMU that makes the 
European financial system more crises resilient and more sustainable.  
The CMU initiative and consultation is an example of a “new approach in regulation” 
by the EC that is not significantly different to the Better Regulation approach 
established over the past decades in terms of focusing on business interests to improve 
the quality of regulation and reduce implementation deficits and providing little space 
for influence from other group interests. However, with the deregulatory focus and 
the stronger emphasis on achieving change via market mechanisms it is a rather 
important turn in financial regulation, putting also more emphasis on growth and 
investment than on financial stability. In the words of Commissioner Hill, “the 
greatest threat we face to financial stability is a lack of jobs and growth.”57 This is a 
risky turn away from some strong lessons from the global financial crisis that have 
never been accepted by the mainstream and key actors. As a result reforms have 
remained limited to insufficient measures dealing with problematic structures and 
activities of modern finance and reforms have failed to develop transformative 
strategies that could downsize finance. The CMU initiative brings us one step further 
away from such a goal. But the implementation will not come without severe conflicts 
and flows reflecting the diverse interests of European economic systems and actors.  
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